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Abstract
Background: The influenza A/H1N1/09 pandemic spread quickly during the Southern Hemisphere winter in 2009 and
reached epidemic proportions within weeks of the official WHO alert. Vulnerable population groups included indigenous
Australians and remote northern population centres visited by international travellers. At the height of the Australian
epidemic a large number of troops converged on a training area in northern Australia for an international exercise, raising
concerns about their potential exposure to the emerging influenza threat before, during and immediately after their arrival
in the area. Influenza A/H1N1/09 became the dominant seasonal variant and returned to Australia during the Southern
winter the following year.
Methods: A duplex nucleic acid amplification assay was developed within weeks of the first WHO influenza pandemic alert,
demonstrated in northwestern Australia shortly afterwards and deployed as part of the pathology support for a field
hospital during a military exercise during the initial epidemic surge in June 2009.
Results: The nucleic acid amplification assay was twice as sensitive as a point of care influenza immunoassay, as specific but
a little less sensitive than the reference laboratory nucleic acid amplification assay. Repetition of the field assay with blinded
clinical samples obtained during the 2010 winter influenza season demonstrated a 91.7% congruence with the reference
laboratory method.
Conclusions: Rapid in-house development of a deployable epidemic influenza assay allowed a flexible laboratory response,
effective targeting of limited disease control resources in an austere military environment, and provided the public health
laboratory service with a set of verification tools for resource-limited settings. The assay method was suitable for rapid
deployment in time for the 2010 Northern winter.
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Introduction
During the first few weeks of the 2009 influenza pandemic,
infection spread quickly through New Zealand and Australia as
winter was setting in. The World Health Organization influenza
pandemic alert triggered the Australian Health Management Plan
for Pandemic Influenza and set in motion a series of public health
responses that included the World Health Organization Collab-
orating Centre for Influenza Reference and Research in
Melbourne; National Influenza Centres in Melbourne, Sydney
and Perth (PathWest Laboratory Medicine WA), and other
reference laboratories in the Australian Public Health Laboratory
Network. Influenza virus RNA extracts were obtained from the
first cases confirmed in New Zealand and distributed to a group of
regional reference laboratories, including our own, for in-house
assay development. These assays were subsequently modified and
validated on Australian clinical samples [1]. When the influenza
pandemic arrived in Australia in May 2009, plans for a large
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an advanced stage. We had previously used deployable PCR
assays for emerging infectious disease response capacity-building
in remote, resource limited settings overseas [2]. A deployable
influenza A/H1N1/09 PCR assay was therefore added to the
molecular diagnostic repertoire planned for the army exercise, and
a preliminary proof-of-concept deployment to tropical Western
Australia (WA) organized through the PathWest regional labora-
tory network [3]. Our concerns about spread of influenza among
the military were based on the 1918-19 influenza pandemic which
was thought to have had its origins in army training camps
in the USA [4], when rapid spread of influenza was aided by
large concentrations of service personnel in shared accommoda-
tion. Unlike in 1918, military health services now protect
their personnel through influenza surveillance and vaccination
programmes [5]. However, influenza A/H1N1/09 arrived in
Australia several months before a vaccine was available. The
arrival of an overseas contingent from an area already experienc-
ing pandemic influenza to join the 2009 exercise placed an even
greater emphasis on the need for clinical and public health
laboratory support in the field. The only diagnostic method
available in the field hospital was a point of care influenza A and B
antigen detection ELISA (BD Directigen Flu A+B, Becton-
Dickenson, VIC, Australia). This was backed up by referral of
positive samples to the civilian health system for A/H1N1/09
PCR assay, a process that took 5–7 days to generate results due to
the heavy workload at the regional hospital laboratory and its
corresponding public health reference laboratory [6]. Early in the
pandemic it was known that, compared to PCR, the point of care
test (POCT) was insensitive for the detection of influenza,
especially the pandemic strain [7]. We therefore set out to conduct
an in-use evaluation of the field-deployable influenza PCR assay,
then maintain its currency for deployment during future influenza
epidemics.
Materials and Methods
Deployment logistics
Equipment items (thermocyclers, magnetic particle processor,
microfuges, heating blocks, tube racks and pipettes) were shipped
in air freight crates with secured moving parts, internal padding
and dust exclusion measures. Consumables requiring cold chain
during shipment were dispatched with dry ice or cold blocks as
dictated by optimum transit temperature requirements. Nucleic
acid amplification assays were dispatched as pre-dispensed
mastermix, controls and ultra pure water in multiple small
aliquots. Reagent stocks were calculated to allow 96 RNA
purifications and nucleic acid reactions equivalent to 80 patient
samples and appropriate controls.
Clinical samples
These were collected within 48 hours of onset of illness from
military personnel with clinically-suspected influenza. Plain cotton
swabs were used to collect samples from both anterior nares and
two swabs from the posterior oropharynx. Duplicate samples from
all four locations were obtained for the POCT. A further series of
40 consecutive anonymous and previously analysed nasal swab
samples was obtained through PathWest Laboratory Medicine
WA during August 2010 in order to identify any changes in assay
specificity. Clinical samples were collected and processed in
accordance with standard Australian hospital laboratory practice
as a field-deployed extension of the Public Health Laboratory
Network influenza pandemic response. Standard pathology
sample collection consent procedures were observed at all times
and the process periodically reviewed by the field hospital’s Senior
Medical Officer. Collated results, analysis and this manuscript
were reviewed by Defence Health commanders. Clearance for
peer-review publication of the anonymised data was obtained
through the office of the Colonel of Health, Forces Command,
Australian Defence Force and from her subordinate commanders.
Respiratory samples were obtained from both anterior nares of
military personnel with suspected influenza, and twice from the
posterior oropharynx using a pair of dedicated PCR swabs per
patient. Duplicate samples from all four locations were obtained
for influenza immunoassay.
PCR assays
The reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR) assays were per-
formed on one of the deployable molecular laboratory main
modules assembled to operate in a static field hospital setting
(Figure 1). This comprised an automated magnetic particle
processor for nucleic acid purification (MagMax-24, Applied
Biosystems), a real time thermal cycler (StepOne, Applied
Biosystems) and a laptop computer running under Windows XP.
The influenza assay incorporated primers and probes directed at
targets in the matrix gene of influenza A and in the HA gene of A/
H1 2009 (table 1) that had been validated in an in-house duplex
real time RT-PCR assay [1]. A comparison of viral RNA
extraction methods was performed using the hand-held magnetic
bead extraction device (6 tube magnetic rack, Applied Biosystems)
from a second field laboratory module comprising more easily
transportable equipment. The other components of that module
(bench top microfuge, a conventional thermal cycler (2720,
Applied Biosystems) and a labchip bioanalyser (Expert 2100,
Agilent) were not used for the RT-PCR assays.
Point of care tests (POCT)
Use of the Directigen Flu A+B immunoassay continued after the
deployable nucleic acid amplification assays had been set up in the
field and was run in parallel with PCR assays, the duplicate nasal
and throat swabs being collected for this purpose. The tests were
Figure 1. Deployable molecular microbiology laboratory.
Deployable molecular biology equipment used during the exercise.
The layout corresponds to the two modules; left table – static field
hospital used for real time PCR assays, right table – field portable. Only
the hand-held magnetic bead extraction device from the field portable
module was used in an attempt to detect influenza A by PCR assay
during the military exercise.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025526.g001
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were performed concurrently by different operators than those
carrying out the PCR assays. Due to the short turnaround time of
the POCT these results were available earlier than the PCR assay
results, but results for the different tests were collected and
interpreted separately.
PCR assay sensitivity and specificity
Thiswas initially determined for the StepOne thermocycler using
serial dilutions of RNA extracts from samples known to be positive
for the pre-pandemic seasonal influenza A/H1N1, influenza A/
H1N1 2009, influenza A/H3N2 and influenza B. This preceded
the field trial in 2009. The sensitivity and specificity of the influenza
A RT-PCR assays, including the extraction and detection
components, were reassessed in August 2010 using 40 consecutive
influenza positive clinical samples to PathWest Laboratory
Medicine WA and 8 negative controls (molecular grade ultrapure
water, Fisher Biotech, WA), blind to parallel tests conducted with
the reference laboratory high throughput equipment [1].
Virus isolation was not practicable under field conditions, and
could not be performed at the reference laboratory due to
workload constraints during the pandemic, and because prolonged
storage and transit times meant that the viability of the virus could
not be ensured.
Results
Initial evaluations of the StepOne on serial dilutions of RNA
extracts from known positive samples showed the matrix assay to
be as sensitive as the reference assay for the detection of influenza
A matrix gene of pre-pandemic seasonal influenza A/H1N1,
influenza A/H1N1 2009 and influenza A/H3N2; and for the HA
gene of influenza A/H1N1 2009 (Table 2). As expected it did not
detect the matrix gene of influenza B. The A/H1N1 HA gene
assay was also equivalent to the reference method for detection of
that gene, but as expected did not detect the HA gene of any of the
other influenza viruses. The reference method had a known limit
of detection of 223–297 copies/ml for the assays used [1].
A total of 12 patients were sampled in the field hospital during
the 2009 exercise, resulting in 13 sets of swabs (one patient was
sampled twice due to progression of symptoms following an initial
negative result). The field laboratory influenza A RT-PCR assay
with the combination of automated RNA extraction and real time
PCR produced the highest diagnostic yield, with at least one A/
H1N1/09 positive result from every referred patient. This was
achieved in around three hours from swab collection. The assay
using extracts from the handheld magnetic bead extraction device
was less sensitive (nasal swab extract, 50%; throat swab extract,
60%), and some of the false negative results coincided with
demonstrable PCR inhibition (3 nose, 5 throat swabs, respective-
ly). The sensitivity of the hand held device extraction method was
similar to the POCT which only detected around half the A/
H1N1/09 results from nose swab extracts (54%), though the
POCT had the additional disadvantage of not being able to
determine the influenza virus subtype. The 50 mL sample volume
required by the smaller portable magnetic bead extraction device
(MagMax-24) goes some way to explain a lower sensitivity than we
obtained with the high throughput magnetic bead extraction
device (MagMax-96) which operates with a 200 mL sample input
volume.
The deployable influenza nucleic acid amplification assay was
again assessed in 2010 order to measure assay sensitivity against
the influenza A viruses circulating in that year (Table 3). It was
carried out blind to the positive clinical samples and water controls
supplied by the reference laboratory The PCR assay achieved a
sensitivity of 89.2% for detection of influenza A matrix gene and
93.5% for the A/H1N1 2009 HA gene in H1N1 clinical samples,
while the specificity for both assays was 100%. Two of the false
negative results (one A/H1N1/09 and influenza A matrix gene)
were borderline results that were consistent with low viral titre in
the clinical sample and favoured the higher volume reference
laboratory assay. One sample was positive in the A/H1N1/09
assay but negative in the influenza A matrix assay which may be
due to a slightly higher sensitivity of the A/H1N1/09 assay
compared to the A/matrix assay. The other discrepant result was a
detection failure on both the matrix and A/H1N1/09 field assays
Table 1. Nucleic acid amplification assay primers & probes.
Target Oligo name Sequence (59 to 39)
Influenza
A M gene
{
INFLUA-MATF CTTCTAACCGAGGTCGAAACGTA
INFLUA-MATR GGTGACAGGATTGGTCTTGTCTTTA
FA-MAT-PR-FAM FAM-TCAGGCCCCCTCAAAGCCGAG-BHQ1
H1N1 2009
HA gene
SWHA-F1.2 AAGGTGTAACGGCAGCATGTC
SWHA-R1.2 TAGGATTTGCTGAGCTTTGGGTAT
SWHA-probe 1.2 X-TGCTGGAGCAAAAAGCTTCT-MGBNFQ
{- Oligo sequences are as previously reported 2010 (1).
X- FAM was used for the monoplex H1 2009 assay, VIC was used for the duplex
assay.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025526.t001
Table 2. Performance of deployable assay for detection of influenza A/H1N1 2009 according to specimen type and viral RNA
extraction method.
PoCT
MagMAX-24 extraction StepOne thermal
cycler Labeled probe
6-tube hand-held extraction StepOne thermal cycler
Labeled probe
Nose Nose Throat Nose Throat
Positive 7 12 11 4 3
Negative 6 0 0 4 2
Equivocal 0 0 1 0 0
Inhibitory 0 0 0 3 5
Not Done 0 0 0 2 3
POCT = point of care test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025526.t002
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titre) result, possibly indicating a pipetting error.
Discussion
We have shown that by adapting assays developed in a
reference laboratory, it is possible to deliver a PCR-based assay
for detection of a newly emerging infectious disease threat in field
conditions, using test platforms currently in use.
The process of assay development described here was driven by
sudden changes in the regional epidemiology of influenza [6,8]. It
relied on close collaboration with a network of public health
laboratories, coupled with prior experience of field deployable
molecular assays [1–3]. The approach we took to diagnostic and
public health support aimed to provide specific results in a short
enough time frame to influence decisions on treatment, infection
control and health risk assessment. The ability to inform health
decision-makers with specific laboratory results allowed more
targeted use of oseltamivir and more effective use of a tented
isolation ward [9]. Influenza spread among deployed military units
can be rapid, as occurred in the spring of 1918 [4]. Several other
instances of rapid spread of influenza in a military setting were
reported following the 2009 pandemic, emphasizing the vulnera-
bility of large formations of unvaccinated service personnel [10,11].
The very high positive rate among the soldiers who were tested
suggests that there was a larger number of other personnel with
influenza who did not present to their regimental medical post,
possibly due to the mild nature of the infection in this physically fit,
young adult population. That would be consistent with the large
numbers of civilian cases of pandemic influenza detected at that
time by hospital and public health laboratories in Queensland and
other parts of Australia due to the spread of infection beyond its
initial Australian epicentre in Victoria [8]. The low sensitivity of
POCT diagnostic aids for influenza has been reported previously
both before and during the current pandemic, emphasising the
importance of PCR assays for reliable diagnosis [7,12,13]. It is
possible that the low sensitivity of the POCT used prior to
deployment of the molecular laboratory led to low expectations of
the field hospital’s diagnostic service and therefore reluctance to
submit further diagnostic samples from referring units. The
modular laboratory approach allowed a degree of adaptation to
these changing priorities, and was limited only by the scope and
range of the reagent stock. The static field hospital module was
able to meet variable levels of demand (from 1 to 24 samples per
batch) for nine days without resupply. It was able to cope with
basic quality control and troubleshooting during the initial
insertion and operational phases including determination of
extraction efficiency. The equipment was surprisingly robust and
tolerated extreme conditions of varying temperature, vibration
and dust.
The RT-PCR field assay using automated viral RNA extraction
appeared to be slightly less sensitive than the tests performed by
the reference method in the 2010 evaluation, possibly due to the
lower specimen volume used (50 mL compared with 200 mL) and
ideally this needs be addressed. However, it performed well in our
small number of patients and was clearly superior to the POCT in
the 2009 field trial, though larger sample numbers are required to
properly assess the diagnostic sensitivity and specificity. Also, it
would be preferable to include specific assays for influenza A/H3
and for influenza B to improve the diagnostic yield. It was also
apparent that there was a trade-off between sensitivity and
portability, since the highly mobile laboratory module (hand held
magnetic bead extraction device) did not perform with a higher
sensitivity than the POCT. Further work is needed to develop an
acceptable near-patient test.
There are an increasing number of commercially available
systems for simplified PCR testing for influenza viruses [14] at
various stages of development and validation that may be able to
fulfill similar roles. Some are designed for possible use outside large
laboratories [15] but have not been tested in field laboratories.
Others have the potential to deliver results closer to the patient
[14,16] but have yet to be evaluated in that setting for humans,
though there is some early data from animal studies [17] . The
weaknesses of all these devices is that they are not easily or quickly
adaptable to new or changing pathogens, they may not offer the
range of tests required in different geographic or climatic
situations, and they may be expensive to perform.
A deployable influenza assay capability lends itself to temporary
operation in small hospitals where the faster turn around times of
close to point of care tests can be exploited to maximum effect. We
have shown that a deployable laboratory response can be mounted
rapidly and operated in austere, resource limited settings to meet
an anticipated surge of epidemic influenza cases shortly after the
onset of a pandemic. Preparation of a deployable laboratory
capability based on influenza virus strains circulating during the
Table 3. Deployable assay performance with 2010 clinical samples.
Assay results
Assay target Influenza A matrix gene Influenza A/H1N1 HA gene
Influenza A/H1N1 2009 28/31 29/31
Influenza A/H3 5/6 0/6
Influenza B 0/3 0/3
Negative controls 0/8 0/8
Sensitivity 89.2% 93.5%
Specificity 100% 100%
Positive predictive value 1.00 1.00
Negative predictive value 0.73 0.895
Total true positives 37 31
Total true negatives 11 17
Samples from 40 consecutive influenza-positive patients (31 influenza A/H1N1/09, 6 influenza A/H3 and 3 influenza B) plus 8 negative controls (ultrapure water).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025526.t003
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laboratory response to influenza. Furthermore we believe this
approach has applications for the detection of a wide range of
infectious agents in similar settings, and can be tailored to meet
local requirements.
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